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REGULATION OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
FIRMS AFTER MORRISON V. NATIONAL 
AUSTRALIA BANK 
ARTHUR B. LABY† 
INTRODUCTION 
Several large financial firms straddle the globe.  They have 
well known names, such as Deutsche Bank, Barclays, JPMorgan 
Chase, BNP Paribas, and HSBC.  The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) has a strong 
interest in regulating the securities activities of these firms to 
help ensure investor protection.  For those firms located outside 
of the United States, the SEC has applied the federal securities 
laws extraterritorially using doctrines developed over years by 
the agency and the courts, including the conduct and effects test, 
described below.  The law of extraterritoriality is complicated, a 
patchwork quilt of cases, administrative rules, and SEC staff no-
action letters applying and interpreting the federal securities 
laws.1  Notwithstanding the complexity, the SEC has not shrunk 
from applying the federal securities laws to non-U.S. domiciled 
firms. 
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion that 
rewrote the law of extraterritoriality, shattering decades of 
precedent and calling into question the SEC’s ability to regulate 
foreign firms.  In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the 
 
† Professor, Rutgers University School of Law. I wish to thank Jean Galbraith, 
Kathryn Kovacs, Beth Stephens, and David Zaring for comments on an earlier draft. 
I am grateful also for comments received from participants at the 2012 St. John’s 
University School of Law Symposium, Revolution in the Regulation of Financial 
Advice: The U.S., the U.K. and Australia, the 2012 German-American Lawyers 
Association Annual Conference on German and American Law at Fordham Law 
School, and a 2013 lecture at the Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 
Germany. 
1 In a no-action letter, an authorized member of the SEC staff indicates that the 
staff will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if a proposed 
transaction described in an incoming letter is consummated. See Procedures Utilized 
by the Division of Corporation Finance for Rendering Informal Advice, Securities Act 
Release No. 6253, 21 SEC Docket 320 n.2 (Oct. 28, 1980). 
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Court disallowed an action brought under Securities Exchange 
Act section 10(b)2 by non-U.S. plaintiffs suing a non-U.S. 
company with shares listed outside of the United States.3  In 
doing so, the Supreme Court invalidated the long-standing 
conduct and effects test to determine extraterritorial application 
of the securities laws.4  As soon as the case was decided, 
Congress attempted to reverse it for SEC actions and for criminal 
actions brought by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.5  
The legislative fix, however, is incomplete.6  Morrison, therefore, 
continues to have broad implications for the government’s 
extraterritorial application of the securities laws. 
In Morrison’s aftermath, Congress, the SEC, and 
commentators focused on its enforcement implications.  In Dodd-
Frank, Congress sought to provide the SEC and DOJ with 
authority to enforce the securities laws against non-U.S. 
domiciled persons.7  The SEC, as evidenced by a study of cross-
border actions required by Dodd-Frank, appears to be focused on 
Morrison’s enforcement implications.8  Scholarship stemming 
from Morrison has similarly focused on the ability of government 
or private plaintiffs to sue non-U.S. domiciled defendants.9 
 
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
3 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
4 Id. at 2881. 
5 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 
and 41 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2010)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
6 See infra Part III.A. 
7 Dodd-Frank Act, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010). 
8 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N STAFF, STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE OF THE 
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 
OF 1934 AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 929Y OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2012). Although Congress directed the SEC to 
study the cross-border scope of private rights of action, the seventy page study does 
not mention Morrison’s regulatory and registration implications. 
9 See, e.g., Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: 
Understanding the Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535, 548–49 (2012) (analyzing actions 
brought under state law after Morrison); Roger W. Kirby, Access to United States 
Courts by Purchasers of Foreign Listed Securities in the Aftermath of Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd., 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 223, 225 (2011) (criticizing the 
opinion and arguing that non-U.S. plaintiffs continue to have access to U.S. courts); 
Alex Reed, But I’m an American! A Text-Based Rationale for Dismissing F-Squared 
Securities Fraud Claims After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 14 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 515, 537–38 (2012) (proposing a text-based rationale as opposed to a policy 
rationale for Morrison). 
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This Article is different.  I shall focus not on enforcement but 
rather on regulatory implications of the Court’s decision.  By 
regulatory implications, I am referring to the SEC’s efforts to 
require registration of non-U.S. domiciled firms and regulate 
those firms in the ordinary course of their business operations.  
Regulation and registration of such firms occur regardless of 
whether the firms ever become the subject of an enforcement 
investigation or proceeding.  As I describe below, Morrison dealt 
a severe blow to the SEC’s ability to regulate non-U.S. domiciled 
investment advisers and broker-dealers.  The Supreme Court 
overturned doctrines the SEC relied on for many years when 
regulating foreign firms.  As a result, the SEC must revise its 
regulatory approach.  In particular, SEC regulation of non-U.S. 
advisers can no longer rely solely on the conduct and effects test; 
regulation of non-U.S. broker-dealers under Securities Exchange 
Act Rule 15a-610 will likely be revisited as well. 
These implications, although of paramount importance to the 
SEC’s regulatory program, to the firms affected, and to investor 
protection, have escaped attention.  As of January 2014, no U.S. 
court of appeals has addressed Morrison’s regulatory 
implications and only one district court, discussed below, has had 
occasion to rule on related issues.11  The goal of this Article is to 
identify these implications and the challenges posed in 
addressing them.  I shall not attempt here to resolve those 
challenges or develop an argument for or against 
extraterritoriality. 
Part I of the Article reviews the Morrison decision with 
particular focus on the regulation of non-U.S. firms.  Part II 
discusses SEC regulation of non-U.S. domiciled investment 
advisers and broker-dealers, focusing on elements of regulation 
most relevant to Morrison.  Part III identifies regulatory 
challenges arising from Morrison. 
I. THE MORRISON CASE 
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Supreme Court 
held that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“Exchange Act”)12 does not provide a cause of action for non-U.S. 
 
10 See Exchange Act Rule 15a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (2013). 
11 See SEC v. Benger, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
12 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
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plaintiffs suing U.S. and non-U.S. defendants for misconduct in 
connection with securities traded on a non-U.S. exchange.13  In 
an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court applied a robust 
presumption against extraterritorial application of the Exchange 
Act and invalidated the conduct and effects test to determine 
when the Exchange Act applies outside of the United States.14  
The case is of vital importance to law enforcement officials, 
private litigators, regulators, and international lawyers.15 
A. Background 
Morrison’s facts are straightforward.  In 1998, National 
Australia Bank (“NAB”) bought HomeSide Lending, Inc., a 
Florida mortgage servicing company.16  HomeSide’s income 
depended on the number of mortgages it serviced and was 
therefore tied in part to the rate at which borrowers prepay their 
mortgages.  Senior HomeSide officers allegedly manipulated 
HomeSide’s financial models to minimize estimates of early 
prepayments thereby inflating potential future income.  On July 
5, 2001, and again on September 3, 2001, NAB announced that it 
was writing down the value of HomeSide’s assets.  The Morrison 
complaint alleges that by July 2000, NAB and a senior NAB 
officer were aware of HomeSide’s deception and did nothing.17 
The petitioners in Morrison, most of whom were non-U.S. 
persons, had purchased shares of NAB before the write-downs.18  
After the alleged fraud was exposed, they sued NAB, HomeSide, 
and certain NAB and HomeSide officers in federal court in New 
York for violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange 
Act and for a violation of Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.19  The 
petitioners sought to represent a class of foreign purchasers.  
Thus, Morrison was a case of foreign investors suing a foreign 
issuer regarding purchases on a foreign securities exchange.  For 
this reason, Morrison was called a “foreign cubed” or “f-cubed” 
 
13 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010). 
14 Id. at 2877–81. 
15 See Florey, supra note 9, at 535–40. 
16 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875–76. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 2876. 
19 Section 10(b) provides for antifraud liability under the Exchange Act. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). Rule 10b-5 is the SEC’s antifraud rule adopted under 
Exchange Act section 10(b). 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). Exchange Act section 20(a) 
provides for controlling person liability. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012). 
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case.20  The respondents moved to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.  The district 
court granted the motion on subject matter jurisdiction grounds 
finding that acts in the United States were “at most, a link in the 
chain of an alleged overall securities fraud scheme that 
culminated abroad.”21  The Second Circuit affirmed, stating that 
the NAB’s acts in Australia were “significantly more central to 
the fraud and more directly responsible for the harm” than 
actions taken in Florida.22  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.23 
Before reaching the merits, the Court clarified a significant 
procedural matter, which, as discussed later, is important to 
determine whether the Dodd-Frank Act overrules the Court’s 
opinion.  According to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit 
considered the extraterritorial reach of section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 to present an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.24  The 
Second Circuit, the Court added, was not alone in this position; it 
followed a long line of federal appellate court precedent.25  But 
the Supreme Court held that looking at extraterritorial reach as 
a question of subject matter jurisdiction was a mistake.  “[T]o ask 
what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct §10(b) 
prohibits, which is a merits question.”26  By contrast, subject 
matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear a case, which 
is different from whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief.  There is 
no question that the district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the claim of whether section 10(b) applied to the conduct in 
question.27  The petitioners asked the Court to remand based on 
this procedural error.  The Court, however, found that remand 
was not necessary since an analysis of the lower courts’ decisions 
did not turn on this mistake.28  The lingering question is whether  
 
 
20 Richard Painter et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: 
Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2011). 
21 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876 (2010) (quoting In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. 
Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006)). 
22 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2008). 
23 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 783 (2009). 
24 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (citing Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012)). 
28 Id. 
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the Morrison holding still can be considered one of jurisdiction, 
which Dodd-Frank addressed, or must be deemed one of 
substantive statutory reach. 
B. Morrison’s Extraterritoriality Disquisition 
With this procedural matter out of the way, the Court began 
by asserting that there is a longstanding principle of American 
law that legislation, absent a contrary intent, applies only within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.29  “When a 
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application,” the Court wrote, “it has none.”30  The Court 
explained that, in this case, as in previous cases, the Second 
Circuit disregarded the presumption against extraterritorial 
application and, instead, sought to discern whether Congress 
would have wanted the statute to apply.31 
Justice Scalia explained that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality was wrongly eroded in a pair of cases decided 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,32 
and Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell.33  In 
Schoenbaum, the Second Circuit held that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality did not apply to a transaction in 
securities traded in the United States, even if the transaction 
was effected outside of the United States, because the trading 
would affect the value of shares traded in the United States.34  
The Leasco court held that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applied only when Congress lacked 
prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate and Congress had 
prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate when conduct took place in 
the United States.35 
The Morrison Court explained that these twin tests 
developed into the conduct and effects test, which asked whether 
wrongful conduct occurred in the United States or whether 
wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or 
 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 2878. 
31 Id. 
32 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968). 
33 468 F.2d 1326, 1333–34 (2d Cir. 1972). 
34 Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206–09. 
35 Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334–37. 
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on U.S. citizens.36  The conduct and effects test, according to the 
Court, was of limited benefit.  The question of extraterritoriality 
was reduced to a question of whether a court thought Congress 
would have wanted the resources of U.S. law enforcement to be 
devoted to regulating a foreign transaction as opposed to leaving 
the matter to a foreign government.37  The Court then reviewed a 
court of appeals case and scholarly writings critical of the 
conduct and effects test and concluded that the criticisms were 
justified.38  Problems with judicial speculation of Congress’s 
intent, wrote the Court, militate in favor of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, which should be applied in all cases.39 
C. Morrison’s Holding 
The Court then turned to Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 
explaining that the rule does not extend beyond conduct 
regulated by Exchange Act section 10(b), and that section 10(b) 
contains no language suggesting extraterritorial application.40  
The Court addressed three arguments the petitioners raised in 
support of extraterritorial application.  First, the definition of 
interstate commerce in section 10(b) includes commerce and 
other activity “between any foreign country and any State.”41  
The Court dismissed this argument, stating that general 
reference to “foreign commerce” in a definition of interstate 
commerce does not defeat the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.42  Second, Congress stated in the Exchange 
Act that prices established in transactions conducted on 
securities exchanges and in the over-the-counter markets are 
“disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and 
foreign countries.”43  The Court pointed out, however, that this 
provision of the Exchange Act also states that the transactions  
 
 
 
 
36 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 (quoting SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 
(2d Cir. 2003)). 
37 Id. at 2879–80. 
38 Id. at 2880–81. 
39 Id. at 2881. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 2882 (quoting Exchange Act § 3(a)(17), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (2012)). 
42 Id. (quoting E.E.O.C v. Arabian Am. Oil. Co., 499 U.S. 244, 251–52 (1991)). 
43 Id. (quoting Exchange Act § 2(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2)). 
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are “affected with a national public interest” and reference to the 
dissemination of prices abroad does not defeat the 
extraterritoriality presumption.44 
The petitioners’ third argument deserves more explanation.  
As background, Exchange Act section 30(b) grants rulemaking 
authority to the SEC and references extraterritorial application.  
Under this section, the Exchange Act does not apply to persons 
who engage in securities transactions outside of the United 
States unless in contravention of rules the Commission may 
prescribe “to prevent the evasion of this chapter.”45  The 
petitioners argued that section 30(b) would be superfluous if the 
Act did not apply extraterritorially.  The Court, however, was not 
persuaded.  This narrow grant of rulemaking authority designed 
to prevent parties from evading U.S. law by transacting overseas 
does not demonstrate that the entire statute applies 
extraterritorially.46  Moreover, section 30(a) of the Act specifically 
provides for extraterritorial application when a broker-dealer 
transacts outside of the United States in a security of a U.S. 
issuer in violation of SEC rules.47  The specificity in section 30(a) 
would be unnecessary if the entire Act applied extraterritorially.  
The Court concluded, therefore, that there is “no affirmative 
indication” in the statute that section 10(b) applies 
extraterritorially.48 
The Court also addressed the petitioners’ argument that 
certain deceptive activity occurred in the United States and 
section 10(b) was meant to address domestic conduct.49  
According to the Court, the Exchange Act’s focus is not where the 
deception originated, but rather where the purchases and sales 
occurred.50  Section 10(b), the Court explained, does not prohibit 
deceptive conduct, but rather deceptive conduct in connection 
with a purchase or sale of a security.  The statute regulates the 
transaction, not the deception; the transaction location drives the 
statute’s application.51 
 
44 Id. 
45 Exchange Act § 30(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b). 
46 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882. 
47 Exchange Act § 30(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a). 
48 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
49 Id. at 2883–84. 
50 Id. at 2884. 
51 Id. 
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The Court then articulated a new test, known as the 
“transaction test,” limiting the scope of section 10(b)’s application 
to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and 
domestic transactions in other securities.”52  The phrase 
“transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges” is fairly 
precise.  Less certain is the meaning of “domestic transactions in 
other securities.”53  Presumably the phrase refers to transactions 
executed in the United States in securities of a U.S. issuer, even 
if the securities are not listed on an exchange.  The Court, in 
other words, is stating the obvious:  The Exchange Act’s 
application is not limited to exchange listed securities; the Act 
also covers non-exchange listed securities when traded in the 
United States.  Non-exchange listed domestic securities, in other 
words, are unaffected by the holding.54 
In articulating the scope of the phrase “domestic 
transactions,” the Court referenced the Securities Act of 1933 
passed one year before the Exchange Act by the same Congress.55  
The Securities Act, the Court wrote, prohibits making use of the 
means of interstate commerce to sell a security unless a 
registration statement is in effect.56  The Court pointed out that 
the SEC, in its rules, has interpreted the Securities Act not to 
reach sales outside of the United States.57 
 
52 Id.; see Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of 
Law Competition in Securities Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 132, 193 (2012); Painter et al., supra note 20, at 20 n.84. 
53 See SEC v. Ficeto, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1108 n.6 (D.C. Cal. 2011) (“In 
Morrison, the Court did not define what kind of transactions would fall into this 
second category.”); see also Marc I. Steinberg & Kelly Flanagan, Transactional 
Dealings–Morrison Continues To Make Waves, 46 INT'L LAW. 829, 854 (2012) (“The 
second prong of the Morrison transactional test raises a host of questions.”). 
54 Ficeto, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1113 (“[T]he Court considered non-exchange 
domestic securities markets to be unaffected by its holding.”). 
55 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. (citing Securities Act Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (2013)). The 
Court’s reliance on Regulation S is curious. Securities Act Rule 901 is one of several 
rules that compose Regulation S, a safe harbor in which the SEC has determined 
that certain offers and sales will be deemed outside of the United States and 
therefore not subject to the registration provisions of Securities Act section 5. This 
provision, however, applies only to section 5. The preliminary notes to Regulation S 
limit its application to the Securities Act’s registration context. The SEC stated that 
the rules do not apply “to antifraud or other provisions of the federal securities 
laws.” Securities Act Regulation S, Preliminary Note 1, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 Refs & 
Annos (2013). Ironically, the Supreme Court is doing just what the SEC cautioned 
against: reasoning about the application of the antifraud provision of the Exchange 
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Justice Stevens, writing a concurring opinion, rebuked the 
majority for upsetting a significant body of securities law.  
According to the concurrence, the Second Circuit refined the 
conduct and effects test with the approval of Congress, other 
circuit courts, and the SEC.58  The conduct and effects test, 
therefore, should be celebrated, not purged from section 10(b) 
jurisprudence.  As for the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the concurrence stated that the majority 
misapplied it for two reasons.  First, the presumption should not 
be considered a clear statement rule; it should be seen as a 
background norm that can be overcome even absent clear 
congressional direction.59  Second, the presumption applies only 
when a fraud has no effect in the United States and is executed 
outside of the United States and, therefore, has only “marginal 
relevance” to Morrison.60  According to the concurrence, the real 
issue, never addressed by the majority, is whether the quality 
and quantity of contacts in the United States are sufficient to 
apply section 10(b).61 
The majority opinion was immediately recognized as 
significant.  Lawyers knew it was highly controversial, predicting 
it would have a “profound” effect on securities litigation.62  
Defense lawyers praised the decision for providing “much needed 
clarity” to the scope of the securities laws’ antifraud provisions.63  
For plaintiffs seeking to sue non-U.S. parties, the decision was 
 
Act by relying on language intended for a different purpose under a different 
statute. 
58 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2890–91 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Breyer 
wrote another concurrence emphasizing that the purchases took place in Australia 
and involved Australian investors. Id. at 2888 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
59 Id. at 2891–92 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
60 Id. at 2892. 
61 Id. 
62 Matthew W. Close et al., SEC Report on the Supreme Court’s Morrison 
Decision and Commissioner Aguilar’s Dissent Set the Stage for Congress To Consider 
Legislation To Expand the Reach of US Securities Laws, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP 
(Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.omm.com/sec-report-on-the-supreme-courts-morrison-
decision-and-commissioner-aguilars-dissent-set-the-stage-for-congress-to-consider-
legislation-to-expand-the-reach-of-us-securities-laws-04-16-2012. 
63 Supreme Court’s Morrison Decision Puts an End to Litigating Foreign-Cubed 
Cases in U.S. Courts, ROPES & GRAY (June 24, 2010), http://www.ropesgray.com/ 
files/Publication/04201a69-4c08-445c-b8ee-33f821ea527e/Presentation/Publication 
Attachment/959da9cc-9dc4-46b5-b10a-37fd019edfc0/06252010SecLitAppellateAlert. 
pdf. 
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called “heartbreaking.”64  Morrison is also significant because it 
mirrors Supreme Court jurisprudence in other contexts limiting 
the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction.65 
II. SEC REGULATION OF NON-U.S. INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND 
BROKER-DEALERS 
The Court’s robust application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and rejection of the conduct and effects test 
have important implications for the regulation and registration 
of non-U.S. domiciled firms.  Although the public face of the SEC 
is most clearly seen through enforcement actions, much of the 
agency’s day-to-day responsibilities have little or nothing to do 
with enforcement.  Enforcement decisions are ex post; the federal 
securities laws empower the SEC to investigate violations of 
statutes and rules.66  By contrast, regulatory actions are ex ante.  
Examples are adopting administrative rules, granting exemptive 
applications, writing no-action letters, and making registration 
determinations.  Through these actions, the agency determines in 
advance whether and when persons, firms, or transactions 
should be subject to rules or standards of conduct and what those 
rules or standards should be.67 
Morrison raises questions about the extraterritorial 
application of the securities laws at the ex ante stage as well the 
ex post stage.  This Part discusses extraterritorial regulation of 
non-U.S. domiciled advisers and brokers.  Regulation here refers 
 
64 Luke Green, Reflecting on Securities Class Actions One Year After Morrison v. 
NAB, INSIGHT: SECURITIES LITIGATION (ISS) (June 24, 2011, 2:39 PM), 
http://blog.issgovernance.com/slw/2011/06/reflecting-on-securities-class-actions-one-
year-after-morrison.html. 
65 See F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 163–64 (2004) 
(holding that the U.S. antitrust laws do not apply to conduct with adverse foreign 
effect independent of adverse domestic effect); see also Tanya J. Monestier, 
Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res Judicata, 86 TUL. L. 
REV. 1, 75 (2011) (arguing that Empagran, Morrison, and other cases call for U.S. 
restraint in adjudicating foreign claimants’ claims in U.S. class actions). 
66 See, e.g., Exchange Act § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2012); see also JAMES D. 
COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 803–07 (2009) 
(describing the SEC’s enforcement processes). 
67 For the SEC’s own summary of its responsibilities, including both 
enforcement and regulatory actions, see The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC 
Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Dec. 
13, 2013); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 29–30 
(rev. 6th ed. 2009) (describing the responsibilities of the SEC’s operating divisions). 
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to governmental decisions regarding whether a non-U.S. 
domiciled firm must register with the SEC or is otherwise subject 
to SEC regulation in its course of business.68  For non-U.S. 
advisers, the SEC has relied in large part on the conduct and 
effects test.  For non-U.S. brokers, the SEC has assumed that the 
Exchange Act applies extraterritorially.  Thus, in both cases, the 
SEC has applied the securities laws extraterritorially in ways 
Morrison roundly rejected.  This Part first discusses advisers and 
then turns to brokers. 
A. Investment Advisers 
Investment advisers are regulated under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), one of several securities 
laws passed in the aftermath of the Crash of 1929 and the Great 
Depression.69  The Advisers Act grew out of an SEC study on 
investment companies and investment trusts and was passed 
alongside the Investment Company Act of 1940, which regulates 
mutual funds and other types of investment companies.  The 
Advisers Act generally defines “investment adviser” as any 
person in the business of providing advice about securities for 
compensation.70  The Act contains an antifraud provision 
applicable to advisers that meet the definition.71  It also requires 
advisers to register with the SEC, unless exempted or prohibited 
from registration.72  Registered advisers are subject to detailed 
regulation, including in-person inspection and examination by 
SEC staff,73 books and records requirements,74 restrictions on 
advisory contracts,75 and custody safeguards.76 
 
68 The securities laws often impose regulatory requirements even if the entity is 
not required to register. Investment advisers, for example, must comply with 
Advisers Act section 206, the antifraud provision, regardless of whether the adviser 
must register. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012). 
69 Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq. (2012). For an overview, see generally 
TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: 
MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISERS (2d ed. 2013); THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, 
REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS (2012). 
70 Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). 
71 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6. 
72 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3. 
73 § 204(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(a). 
74 Id. 
75 § 205(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a). 
76 § 223, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18b. 
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The SEC historically has presumed that the Advisers Act 
applies extraterritorially.  As originally passed in 1940, the Act 
was shorn of reference to non-U.S. advisers and did not address 
extraterritoriality.77  In 1954, the SEC adopted a rule, which 
required non-U.S. investment advisers registering with the SEC 
to file an irrevocable consent and power of attorney appointing 
the SEC as agent to receive service of process, pleadings, and 
other papers in civil actions under the federal securities laws.78  
In adopting the rule, the SEC recognized that as a practical 
matter its rights might be unenforceable against non-U.S. 
advisers servicing non-U.S. persons.  The rule was intended to 
give “full effect” to the securities laws and to give the SEC and 
others the same rights against non-U.S. advisers that they have 
against U.S. advisers.79 
In a 1992 study, the SEC staff struck an aggressive pose to 
apply the Advisers Act extraterritorially, stating that the Act 
contains no territorial limits other than a requirement to use the 
jurisdictional means of interstate commerce.80  The staff noted 
that when regulating non-U.S. advisers, it sought to balance the 
broad reach of the statutory provisions with congressional intent, 
principles of international law, and market realities.81 
Twelve years later, when formulating rules for hedge fund 
advisers, the SEC once again assumed the Advisers Act applied 
extraterritorially.82  The Commission stated that its concern 
when developing regulation was to ensure investor protection 
 
77 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847–57 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq. (2012)). 
78 Adoption of Rule Requiring Non-Resident Investment Advisers and Non-
Resident General Partners of Managing Agents of Investment Advisers to File 
Consent to Service of Process, Pleadings and Other Papers, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 74, Securities Act Release No. 3506, Exchange Act Release No. 5057, 19 
Fed. Reg. 4300 (July 14, 1954). At the time, the relevant forms were numbered 4-R, 
5-R, 6-R, and 7-R, depending on the type of entity filing. Id. 
79 Id. In 2000, the SEC amended its rules, creating Form ADV-NR (for “non-
resident”) to replace Forms 4-R, 5-R, 6-R and 7-R. See Electronic Filing by 
Investment Advisers; Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 1897, Exchange Act Release No. 43282, 65 Fed. Reg. 57,438 (Sept. 22, 2000). 
80 DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF 
CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 227 (1992), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf. 
81 Id. 
82 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 
Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,072 (Dec. 10, 2004), vacated 
by Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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and a “level playing field” for market participants.83  According to 
the SEC, a level playing field is best achieved through a single 
set of rules so that investors can be confident they are receiving 
the same level of protection, regardless of where their adviser is 
located.84  Commentators generally agreed that, because the 
Advisers Act contains no limit on extraterritorial application, 
non-U.S. advisers are brought under the tent of U.S. law.85 
When determining the conditions under which it would 
apply the Advisers Act outside of the United States and require 
non-U.S. firms to register, the Division of Investment 
Management borrowed from the Division of Enforcement and 
applied the conduct and effects test.86  The staff recognized that 
the antifraud provisions of the securities laws generally have 
broader effect than “purely regulatory” provisions.87  The staff 
argued, however, that as long as the effects are significant or the 
conduct important, “assertion of regulatory jurisdiction is 
appropriate.”88 
The conduct and effects test for advisers evolved over time.  
Early SEC regulation of non-U.S. advisers followed an entity 
approach, regulating each adviser on an entity basis.89  If a non-
U.S. adviser registered with the SEC, for example, the 
Commission would regulate the entire firm as a single entity, 
subjecting all of the firm’s activities to regulation.  SEC 
registration, however, is often undesirable because of the 
regulatory burdens imposed.90  Moreover, the entity approach 
was onerous for non-U.S. domiciled advisers because the entire 
firm would be subject to SEC regulation, not only the adviser’s 
relationships with U.S. clients.91 
 
83 Id. at 72,071. 
84 Id. 
85 CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION: A STEP-BY-STEP 
GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW § 35:1 (2011). 
86 DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 80, at 227–29 
87 Id. at 228. 
88 Id. For support, the SEC staff relied on section 416 of the Restatement (Third) 
of Foreign Relations, entitled Jurisdiction To Regulate Activities Related To 
Securities. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 416 (1987). A 
careful reading of this provision does not clearly support the open-ended application 
of the conduct and effects test for regulating investment advice. The SEC, however, 
has crafted the regulatory structure for advisers under a conduct and effects regime. 
89 DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 80, at 223–24 n.7. 
90 Id. at 223–24. 
91 Id. at 224. 
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The SEC responded by permitting a dedicated affiliate to 
register with the SEC.92  Under this model, a non-U.S. adviser 
would establish a U.S. or foreign affiliate dedicated to servicing 
U.S. clients.  The affiliate would register with the SEC and the 
foreign firm would continue to conduct its business outside of the 
United States, avoiding SEC oversight.93  The Commission, 
however, was concerned that this structure could be prone to 
abuse.94  A non-U.S. adviser, wishing to serve U.S. clients might 
establish an SEC-registered entity for U.S. clients, but the heart 
of the advice would be provided by the non-U.S. domiciled 
unregistered firm.  The non-U.S. adviser would effectively be 
advising U.S. clients, but it would avoid regulation and 
registration as result of interposing an SEC-registered affiliate.95  
As a result, the SEC had to determine when it would “look 
through” the registered adviser to the non-U.S. firm and regulate 
the non-U.S. firm as if it were the registrant. 
1. Separate Structure 
In a 1981 no-action letter called Richard Ellis, the SEC staff 
provided guidance on when it would refrain from “looking 
through” the SEC-registered entity to the non-U.S. domiciled 
adviser.96  To avoid “look through” treatment by the SEC, the 
wall between the non-U.S. firm and the SEC-registered affiliate 
had to be sufficiently strong to ensure that the non-U.S. firm was 
not the real entity advising U.S. clients.97  As long as the wall 
was strong enough, the foreign firm could engage in certain 
communications with the SEC-registered affiliate and not subject 
itself to SEC registration.98 
 
92 Id. at 224–25. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 229. 
95 See Recordkeeping Requirements and Exemption from Definition of 
“Investment Adviser,” Investment Advisers Act Release No. 353, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 7605, 38 Fed. Reg. 1649 (1973) (“Where all or 
substantially all of the duties and functions related to the rendering of investment 
advice undertaken to be performed by a registered investment adviser are in fact 
performed by the person controlling the registered adviser or an affiliate of such 
controlling person . . . a serious question is raised whether such persons . . . should 
be required to register.”). 
96 Richard Ellis, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 25241 (Sept. 17, 1981). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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The SEC staff stated that it would recognize affiliates as 
separate entities as long as certain conditions were met.99  The 
conditions are generally summarized as follows: (1) the 
registered affiliate must be adequately capitalized; (2) the 
registered affiliate must have a buffer between its personnel and 
the foreign firm’s personnel, such as a board of directors, a 
majority of whose members are independent; (3) the registered 
affiliate must have employees who, if engaged in providing advice 
for the affiliate, must not also engage in providing advice for the 
other entity; (4) the registered affiliate must be responsible for 
deciding what advice is communicated to clients—and the 
registered affiliate must have its own sources of information; and 
(5) the registered affiliate must keep confidential the substance 
of its advice until communicated to clients100—if the SEC 
registrant is the true source of the advice, it should have no 
difficulty in keeping the advice confidential.  As long as these 
conditions were met, the SEC-registered affiliate could 
communicate with the non-U.S. firm and advise U.S. clients, and 
the non-U.S. firm would avoid SEC regulation.101 
2. Integrated Structure 
It soon became apparent that the Ellis conditions were too 
onerous for certain firms.  Under the third condition, for 
example, a non-U.S. firm had to decide whether to dedicate 
senior advisory personnel to its U.S. affiliate.102  Also, this 
condition might not be in the best interest of U.S. investors if it 
meant that a firm would not assign its top advisory personnel to 
the U.S. registrant or if it prevented a free exchange of 
information with personnel advising U.S. investors.103 
As a result, in 1992, the SEC staff instituted a new approach 
to the regulation of non-U.S. advisers.104  The SEC relaxed the 
requirements for the strict separation between the non-U.S. 
parent and the U.S. affiliate, agreeing that the Commission 
 
99 According to the SEC staff 1992 study, supra note 80, at 225 n.10, the 
conditions were derived from the 1972 SEC Release under the Investment Advisers 
Act and the Investment Company Act. See supra note 95. 
100 DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 80, at 224–25. 
101 Richard Ellis, Inc., supra note 96; see also DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, supra note 80, at 224–25. 
102 DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 80, at 226. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 228–30. 
FINAL_LABY 2/27/2014  6:26 PM 
2013] REGULATION OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL FIRMS 577 
would not apply the substantive provisions of the Advisers Act to 
non-U.S. clients of a non-U.S. adviser that also serviced U.S. 
clients.105  In establishing this approach, the SEC staff employed 
the conduct and effects test to determine when it would apply the 
Advisers Act.106  The staff explained that the conduct and effects 
test typically was applied in the antifraud context.107  
Nevertheless, wrote the staff, “if the effect in the United States is 
sufficiently significant, or the conduct sufficiently important, the 
assertion of regulatory jurisdiction is appropriate.”108  As recently 
as 2012, the SEC staff reaffirmed this approach, stating that the 
Commission and the Division of Investment Management do not 
apply the substantive provisions of the Advisers Act to a 
registered non-U.S. adviser’s activities with regard to non-U.S. 
clients.109 
One caveat to the new approach was that a non-U.S. adviser 
was required to keep books and records for all of its clients—both 
U.S. and non-U.S.—and make them available to the SEC staff 
upon request.110  Information regarding all clients was important 
to the SEC because it could not determine whether an adviser 
fulfilled its fiduciary duty to U.S. clients unless the SEC also had 
information about treatment of non-U.S. clients.111 
In its new approach, codified in an SEC no-action letter 
known as Unibanco, the SEC staff utilized a conduct and effects 
test and revised the conditions for when an affiliate would be 
considered separate and independent from the non-U.S. 
parent.112  Under the new guidelines, the non-U.S. parent would 
not be required to register as long as the following conditions 
were met: (1) the affiliate was separately organized; (2) the 
affiliate was staffed with persons able to provide advice; 
(3) advisory personnel involved in advising U.S. persons in both 
 
105 Id. at 231. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 228. 
108 Id. 
109 See Industrial Alliance, Investment Management, Inc., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2012 WL 888978, at *2 n.4 (March 14, 2012). 
110 DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 80, at 230. 
111 Allocation of investment opportunities is an example. The SEC could 
determine if the adviser was allocating securities to U.S. investors and non-U.S. 
investors fairly if it had access to the adviser’s records with respect to both sets of 
clients. 
112 Uniao de Bancos de Brasileiros S.A., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 183054 
(July 28, 1992). 
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affiliates would be considered “associated persons” of the SEC-
registered affiliate, thereby subjecting them to SEC scrutiny; and 
(4) the SEC had access to records of each affiliate involved in 
U.S. advisory activity to the extent necessary to monitor conduct 
that could harm U.S. investors.113  As of 1992, therefore, the 
conduct and effects test took root as the approach the SEC used 
to regulate non-U.S. advisers. 
Any challenge to these regulatory actions calls for an 
analysis of the level of deference a court should give the SEC.  
Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., federal agencies are generally entitled to deference when 
interpreting statutes they implement.114  Determining the 
appropriate level of deference to accord an agency, however, is a 
fraught exercise with many unanswered questions.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court only recently has held that a court must apply 
Chevron deference when reviewing an agency’s determination of 
its own jurisdiction, which is arguably what the SEC has done 
regarding the regulation of non-U.S. domiciled advisers and 
brokers.115  The fact that the agency interpretations discussed 
here were announced through SEC staff no-action letters, 
however, further complicates whether deference should be 
accorded and if so how much.116 
B. Broker-Dealers 
The SEC’s regulation of non-U.S. domiciled broker-dealers 
after Morrison raises a similar problem to that of advisers.  In 
regulating non-U.S. brokers, the SEC presumed that the 
Exchange Act applies extraterritorially.117  According to 
Morrison, that presumption is erroneous.118 
 
113 Id. 
114 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) (requiring a federal court to accept an agency’s 
construction of a statute if the statute is ambiguous and the construction is 
reasonable). 
115 Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
116 See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC 
No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 921, 978 (1998) (“When the SEC announces a regulatory interpretation in a no-
action letter, application of the Supreme Court’s deference principles becomes far 
more difficult.”). 
117 See infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
118 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 (2010). 
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The Securities Exchange Act of 1934119 was enacted one year 
after the seminal Securities Act of 1933.120  While the Securities 
Act regulated new issues of securities and was primarily a 
registration and disclosure law, the Exchange Act regulated 
trading in the secondary market.121  As a result, the Exchange 
Act provided for detailed oversight of the exchanges and of 
broker-dealers, including registration, prudential regulation, and 
antifraud controls.122  The Exchange Act also established the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission to implement and enforce 
the securities laws.123  Four years later, the Maloney Act 
amendments were enacted, which provided for self-regulation of 
broker-dealers and resulted in the creation of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), now the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the primary self-
regulatory authority for broker-dealer firms.124 
The registration requirement for broker-dealers is found in 
Exchange Act section 15(a), which makes it unlawful for any 
broker or dealer to use the means of interstate commerce, such as 
telephone, fax, or email, unless registered.125  Section 15(a) does 
not, on its face, apply extraterritorially.  The SEC, however, has 
addressed the regulation of foreign broker-dealers in Exchange 
Act Rule 15a-6, adopted in 1989.126  Rule 15a-6 is an exemptive 
rule.  It provides bases on which non-U.S. broker-dealers can 
have contact with certain U.S. persons without having to register 
with the SEC.127  In contrast to investment advisers, for whom 
the law developed through SEC staff no-action letters, in the 
context of broker-dealers, the SEC adopted Rule 15a-6 through  
 
 
119 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a–78oo (2012)). 
120 See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)). 
121 See COX ET AL., supra note 66, at 7–8. 
122 For an overview, see generally 1 CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, BROKER-DEALER 
REGULATION, §§ 1.2, 2.1 (2d ed. 2012); 2 NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, 
BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION, § 17.01 (4th ed. Supp. 2012). 
123 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. at 885 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012)). 
124 Maloney Act of 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3) (2012)) (adding § 15A to the Exchange Act). 
125 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 49 Stat. at 895 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (2012)). 
126 See Exchange Act Rule 15a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (2013). 
127 See id. 
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agency rulemaking procedures.  As a result, the agency would 
likely receive more deference than in the case of no-action 
letters.128 
Rule 15a-6 generally exempts from registration four types of 
activity by non-U.S. broker-dealers: (1) effecting unsolicited 
transactions with U.S. customers; (2) providing research reports 
to major U.S. institutional investors and effecting transactions in 
the securities discussed in those research reports for those 
investors; (3) soliciting and executing transactions for U.S. 
institutional customers as long as an SEC-registered broker-
dealer chaperones the transactions and the broker-dealer agrees 
to provide information to the SEC; and (4) effecting transactions 
on a solicited or unsolicited basis with a U.S. broker-dealer, 
bank, or other persons identified in the rule.129 
In adopting Rule 15a-6, the SEC turned the presumption 
against extraterritoriality on its head, assuming, in the face of 
silence, that the statute applies extraterritorially—precisely the 
reasoning criticized in Morrison.  When adopting Rule 15a-6, the 
SEC stated that the definitions of the terms “broker” and “dealer” 
do not refer to nationality and include both domestic and foreign 
persons.130  In a footnote, the SEC explained further that the 
term “person” is also defined in the Exchange Act and includes no 
reference to nationality.131  Thus, the SEC concluded that “any” 
use of the U.S. jurisdictional means could subject a foreign 
broker-dealer to the registration provisions of the Exchange Act, 
regardless of whether the broker was a domestic or a foreign 
person.132 
One might reflect for a moment on the meaning of this 
statement.  According to the SEC, any use of the U.S. 
jurisdictional means, such as a single phone call or email into the 
United States, could trigger the application of the statute.  
 
128 See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“We 
hold that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies 
for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”). 
129 See Exchange Act Rule 15a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (2013). 
130 Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker Dealers, Exchange Act 
Release No. 27017, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,013, 30,016 (July 18, 1989). 
131 Id. at 30,016 n.40. 
132 Id. at 30,016. 
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Although the SEC might have discretion to overlook minimal use 
of the jurisdictional means, according to the Commission, a single 
instance could theoretically trigger the Exchange Act registration 
provision. 
The Commission included a lengthy footnote in the Rule 15a-
6 adopting release explaining that a potential limitation on 
extraterritorial application may be found in section 30(b) of the 
Act.133  As mentioned, section 30(b) provides that the Act does not 
apply to persons transacting in securities “without the 
jurisdiction of the United States,” unless in violation of an SEC 
rule adopted to prevent evasion of the Act.134  In its footnote, the 
SEC wrote that the exclusion in section 30(b) is not applicable if 
(1) transactions occur in a U.S. securities market, (2) offers and 
sales are made abroad to U.S. persons or in the United States to 
facilitate sales of securities abroad, or (3) the United States is 
used as a base for perpetrating fraud on non-U.S. persons.135  
Note that items (2) and (3) are expressions of the conduct and 
effects test, which, by 1989, was well accepted in the U.S. courts 
of appeals.136 
The Commission staked out a fairly aggressive position in 
Rule 15a-6.  The SEC stated that the phrase “without the 
jurisdiction of the United States” in section 30(b) does not refer to 
territorial limits.137  And even if the phrase refers to territorial 
limits, section 30(b) does not exempt non-U.S. broker-dealers 
engaging in directed selling efforts inside the United States.138  
Such selling efforts, in the SEC’s view, traverse the territory of 
the United States.  The SEC stated: 
A broker-dealer operating outside the physical boundaries of the 
United States, but using the U.S. mails, wires, or telephone 
lines to trade securities with U.S. persons located in this  
 
 
 
133 Id. at 30,016 n.41. 
134 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 904 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2012)). 
135 Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker Dealers, Exchange Act 
Release No. 27017, 54 Fed. Reg. at 30,016. 
136 See Mark I. Steinberg & Kelly Flanagan, Transnational Dealings—Morrison 
Continues To Make Waves, 46 INT’L LAW. 829, 830–32 (2012). 
137 Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker Dealers, Exchange Act 
Release No. 27017, 54 Fed. Reg. at 30,016 n.41. 
138 Id. 
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country, would not be, in the words of section 30(b), 
“transact[ing] a business in securities without the jurisdiction of 
the United States.”139 
This section shows that the regulation of non-U.S. domiciled 
advisers and brokers has for years turned on doctrines 
invalidated by Morrison.  The regulation of non-U.S. advisers, at 
least since 1992, is based largely on the conduct and effects test.  
The regulation of foreign broker-dealers, embodied in Exchange 
Act Rule 15a-6, depends on a presumption of extraterritorial 
application of the statute abrogated by Morrison.  The regulatory 
system for brokers and advisers over the past twenty-five to 
thirty years was carefully choreographed on a stage where the 
backdrop included the conduct and effects test and a 
presumption of extraterritoriality.  The implications of Morrison, 
therefore, are tremendous and will be explored in the next Part. 
III. MORRISON’S IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND 
BROKER-DEALERS 
This Part discusses Morrison’s implications for the 
regulation and registration of non-U.S. domiciled advisers and 
brokers.  It only takes one adviser or broker to challenge the 
SEC’s authority to require registration of non-U.S. domiciled 
firms after Morrison.  Challenges are most likely to occur in the 
context of an enforcement proceeding alleging failure to register.  
In at least one case brought by the SEC, broker-dealers argued 
that Morrison applies in the registration context and, therefore, 
registration was not required.  In SEC v. Benger, the Commission 
included a broker-dealer registration claim against both U.S. and 
non-U.S. brokers effecting allegedly foreign transactions.140  The 
court sided with the defendants and held that, in light of 
Morrison, a broker is not required to register with the SEC where 
the purchase and sale of securities is foreign and, therefore, 
beyond the scope of the Exchange Act.141  Other courts 
undoubtedly will be called upon to address Morrison’s effect in 
the registration context.142 
 
139 Id. 
140 SEC v. Benger, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
141 Id. at 1012, 1016. 
142 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Banc de Binary Ltd., No. 2-13-cv-00993 (D. Nev. 
June 5, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2013/comp-
pr2013-103.pdf (alleging that entity based in Republic of Cyprus and regulated by 
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Before exploring the particulars, I address one matter that is 
not specific to either advisers or brokers, but is essential to 
analyzing Morrison’s effect.  The matter at issue is whether 
Dodd-Frank section 929P effectively reverses Morrison, in which 
case there would be no need to continue the analysis.  After 
addressing section 929P, this Part turns to Morrison’s 
implications for advisers and brokers.143 
A. The Dodd-Frank Act 
In July 2010, shortly after the Court handed down the 
Morrison decision, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act was enacted.144  The Dodd-Frank Act is 
sweeping legislation designed to address systemic risk in the 
financial system, banking, mortgage loans, securitization, 
derivatives, and other topics.145  In addition, Dodd-Frank 
contained a number of provisions not related to the financial 
crisis—stowaways placed on board by those seeking their 
passage regardless of the means.  Section 929P is one of those 
provisions.  As a result of Morrison, Dodd-Frank amended the 
Securities Act, the Advisers Act, and the Exchange Act to provide 
for extraterritorial jurisdiction.146  Under section 929P, United 
States district courts “shall have jurisdiction” over SEC and DOJ 
actions alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of these 
 
the Cyprus SEC, but with an office in New York, must register with the U.S. SEC as 
a broker-dealer because it solicited U.S. investors). 
143 One other general matter is worth mentioning. Perhaps Morrison should be 
limited to its facts and, therefore, have no bearing on the regulation and registration 
of foreign firms. At least one post-Morrison court noted that the Supreme Court 
framed the issue narrowly. SEC v. Gruss, 859 F. Supp. 2d 653, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
SEC v. Ficeto, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011). It would be a mistake, 
however, to limit Morrison to its facts. The Court spent a large part of the opinion 
condemning the conduct and effects test. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 
2869, 2877–81 (2010). Courts of appeals view Supreme Court dicta as having great 
weight. See, e.g., Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Hammond, 384 F.3d 674, 683 (9th Cir. 
2004) (stating that Supreme Court dicta is entitled to “great weight”); McCoy v. 
Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that appellate courts are 
bound by the Supreme Court’s dicta). Thus, arguing for continued application of the 
conduct and effects test, even in a different context, is a formidable task. As a matter 
of practice, post-Morrison courts have applied the case outside the Morrison facts. 
Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Management Holdings Ltd., No. 08-cv-
01381(MSK), 2011 WL 1211511, at *5 (D. Colo. March 31, 2011); SEC v. ICP Asset 
Mgt., LLC, 10 Civ. 4791(LAK), 2012 WL 2359830, at *2 (June 21, 2012). 
144 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
145 See generally DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL (2011). 
146 Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b). 
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statutes so long as the violations involve conduct in the United 
States or conduct outside of the United States that has a 
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.147 
Congress intended section 929P(b) to overrule Morrison.  
Representative Kanjorski’s statement in the legislative record 
referred to Morrison and stated that the purpose of the section 
was to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality and 
clarify that, for actions brought by the SEC and DOJ, the 
specified provisions of the Exchange Act, the Securities Act, and 
the Advisers Act have extraterritorial application when the 
conduct and effects test is met.148  Thus, in light of section 929P, 
one possibility is that Morrison does not apply to the regulation 
of advisers and brokers because Morrison was overruled by 
statute.  This section discusses two reasons why the amendments 
in section 929P might not affect the regulation of advisers and 
brokers discussed here.  One is a drafting reason; the other is a 
matter of scope. 
As George Conway has pointed out, the language added by 
Dodd-Frank may be insufficient to overrule Morrison.149  The 
problem is a technical drafting deficiency.  Recall that Justice 
Scalia explained that the courts of appeals erred by considering 
the extraterritorial reach of the Exchange Act a question of 
jurisdiction.150  Jurisdiction refers only to a court’s power to hear 
a case.  By contrast, the reach of section 10(b), Justice Scalia 
explained, is a merits question.  District courts undoubtedly have 
jurisdiction to determine whether the Exchange Act applies to a 
defendant’s conduct, but the jurisdictional determination is 
“quite separate” from whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief.151 
The Dodd-Frank amendments do not expand the type of 
conduct covered by the statutes; they provide only that district 
courts “shall have jurisdiction” when the conduct and effects test 
is met.152  The amendments arguably do not change current law 
 
147 Id. 
148 156 CONG. REC. H5233, H5237 (June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. 
Kanjorski). 
149 See George T. Conway, III, Extraterritoriality of the Federal Securities Laws 
After Dodd-Frank: Partly Because of a Drafting Error, the Status Quo Should 
Remain Unchanged, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ (July 21, 2010), 
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.17763.10.pdf. 
150 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
151 Id. 
152 See Conway, supra note 149. 
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when jurisdiction is not in doubt.153  Ironically, the language of 
section 929P could be read to diminish the overall extraterritorial 
scope of the federal securities laws because jurisdiction, the 
power to hear extraterritorial disputes, might now be limited to 
the conduct and effects test as articulated in section 929P, when 
no such limitation existed before.  The effect of section 929P will 
likely be litigated in the enforcement context.  The SEC believes 
that section 929P overrules Morrison154 and at least one court has 
suggested that the SEC’s view could prevail.155  But there is a 
reasonable possibility that courts will rule that the amendments 
have no effect on the extraterritorial application of the securities 
laws due to unartful drafting.156 
The second reason the Dodd-Frank amendments might not 
affect the analysis here is that the amendments cover SEC and 
DOJ enforcement cases, not regulation and registration.  One 
might argue that Congress’s intent with respect to enforcement 
should apply equally to regulatory authority.  There are reasons, 
however, to avoid simple cross-application from enforcement to 
regulation.  The reach of the antifraud provisions in the 
enforcement context is greater than the reach of purely 
regulatory provisions.157  Courts have given three reasons for 
this: congressional desire to combat fraud; reduced likelihood of 
conflicts with foreign law; and congressional guidance limiting 
the applicability of regulatory provisions in contrast with silence 
regarding antifraud provisions.158  Thus, even if courts agree with 
the SEC that Dodd-Frank section 929P restores the ability of the 
SEC and the DOJ to bring enforcement actions when the conduct 
 
153 See id. 
154 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N STAFF, supra note 8, at 6. 
155 SEC v. Compania Internacional Financiera S.A., No. 11 Civ. 4904(DLC), 
2011 WL 3251813, at *6 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011). 
156 See Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Provision: Was It Effective, Needed, or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 205–08 
(2011), available at http://www.hblr.org/download/HBLR_1_1/Painter-DFA_ 
Extraterritorial_Jurisdiction_Provision.pdf (asking whether Dodd-Frank does 
anything other than confer jurisdiction and stating that it is uncertain how courts 
will respond). 
157 See Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 
1989) (“[T]he antifraud provisions of American securities laws have broader 
extraterritorial reach than American filing requirements.”); Bersch v. Drexel 
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir. 1975) (“It is elementary that the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to many transactions which are 
neither within the registration requirements nor on organized American markets.”). 
158 E.ON AG v. Acciona, S.A., 468 F. Supp. 2d 569, 573–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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and effects test is met, the Dodd-Frank amendments do not alter 
the circumstances when the SEC can regulate and require 
registration of non-U.S. domiciled firms. 
B. Implications for Advisers 
The sweeping language of Morrison regarding the conduct 
and effects test and the presumption against extraterritoriality 
may restrict the SEC’s ability to regulate non-U.S. domiciled 
advisers.  This section discusses reasons to support that claim.  
The Advisers Act on its face does not apply extraterritorially.  
The registration provision simply prohibits any investment 
adviser unless registered from using the means of interstate 
commerce in connection with its business as an investment 
adviser.159  Although the term “interstate commerce” includes 
communication between any foreign country and any state,160 as 
discussed above, a general reference to “foreign” in a definition of 
interstate commerce does not defeat the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.161 
1. Extraterritoriality by Inference from Dodd-Frank 
A response to the claim that the Advisers Act does not apply 
extraterritorially is that changes in Dodd-Frank, not aimed at 
Morrison, militate in favor of extraterritorial treatment, even if 
the Act did not apply extraterritorially before.  Dodd-Frank 
amended the statutory exemptions from registration in the Act, 
adding a new exemption for “foreign private advisers.”162  The 
exemption replaced the private adviser exemption, which was an 
exemption for any investment adviser with fewer than fifteen 
clients.  If the Act now exempts foreign private advisers as 
defined, one could argue that the statute by implication must 
apply extraterritorially or the exemption would be unnecessary. 
 
159 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (2012). 
160 § 202(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(10). 
161 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882 (2010). 
162 Advisers Act § 203(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). A foreign private adviser is, 
speaking generally, an adviser that has no place of business in the United States; 
has fewer than fifteen clients in the United States and investors in the United 
States in private funds advised by the adviser; has assets under management 
attributable to those clients and investors of less than $25 million; and does not hold 
itself out generally to the public in the United States as an investment adviser. 
§ 202(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30). 
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This argument by implication is unlikely to be sustained 
after Morrison, which requires more specificity before a statute 
applies extraterritorially.  In Morrison, the Solicitor General 
argued that, as a result of language in Exchange Act section 
30(b), the statute applies extraterritorially.  Section 30(b) 
provides that the Act shall not apply to a person conducting a 
transaction outside of the United States unless in violation of an 
SEC rule to prevent evasion of the Act.163  The Solicitor General 
argued that this provision would be unnecessary if the Act did 
not apply in the first instance to transactions abroad. 
The Court disagreed.  First, it would be odd, the Court 
stated, to indicate extraterritorial application of the entire 
statute by imposing a condition precedent to extraterritorial 
application.164  Second, the Court asked rhetorically, if the entire 
Act applied extraterritorially, why would the Commission’s 
authority to adopt regulations be limited to preventing evasion as 
opposed to simply preventing a violation?165  Third, the Court 
stated that, although inferring extraterritoriality from section 
30(b) might be possible, a merely possible interpretation is 
insufficient to override the strong presumption against 
extraterritoriality.166  Finally, the Court pointed to Exchange Act 
section 30(a), which refers specifically to extraterritorial 
application.167  Section 30(a) is a prohibition against transacting 
securities of a U.S. issuer on a non-U.S. exchange in violation of 
an SEC rule.168  The Court wrote that this is the level of 
specificity needed before an act can apply extraterritorially.169 
Thus, after Morrison, the new registration exemption in the 
Advisers Act for foreign private advisers is unlikely to 
demonstrate extraterritoriality for the Advisers Act as a whole.  
Just as Morrison held for the Exchange Act, it would be odd for 
Congress to indicate extraterritorial application of the entire 
statute through a registration exemption for a narrow subset of 
advisers.  Moreover, as the Morrison Court wrote, when a statute 
provides for some extraterritorial application, that does not mean 
 
163 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 30(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2012). 
164 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 2883. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
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that the entire statute applies extraterritorially.170  Rather, “the 
presumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit that 
provision to its terms.”171  Thus, under Morrison, the exemption 
for foreign private advisers is likely to be read as a clarification of 
the non-applicability of the registration provision in certain cases 
as opposed to a broad pronouncement to override the 
presumption against extraterritoriality in all cases under the 
Act. 
If the Advisers Act does not apply extraterritorially, there is 
little basis for the SEC and the courts to use the conduct and 
effects test to determine whether and when to apply the statute 
extraterritorially.  Post-Morrison courts have been clear that the 
conduct and effects test is no longer viable.172  As discussed 
above, the Court dwelled on the conduct and effects test’s 
infirmities and set forth a new test.  After Morrison, it is doubtful 
that the test should be employed at all. 
2. Extraterritoriality Based on the Advisers Act Context 
There is another possibility to permit extraterritorial 
application that should be explored.  Perhaps one can argue that 
the Advisers Act is sufficiently different from the Exchange Act 
to justify different treatment.  Support for this argument can be 
found in SEC v. Gruss.173  The SEC sued Perry A. Gruss, the 
Chief Financial Officer of D.B. Zwirn & Co., L.P., a defunct New 
York-based investment adviser.174  D.B. Zwirn managed five 
hedge funds.  One fund, located in the United States, had a 
severe cash shortage while another located offshore had a 
surplus.  Gruss allegedly authorized $870 million in improper 
transfers between the funds.175  Gruss argued that, in light of 
Morrison, fraud claims must be directed only at U.S. clients.  
Because the fraud involved an offshore fund, Gruss argued, the 
Advisers Act was inapplicable.176 
 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 See, e.g., SEC v. Gruss, 859 F. Supp. 2d 653, 661 (S.D.N.Y 2012) (stating that 
the new transactional test “replaced” the conduct and effects test). 
173 Id. at 653. 
174 Id. at 655. 
175 Id. at 656. 
176 Id. at 660. 
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The Gruss court distinguished Morrison on several 
accounts.177  First, Gruss was brought by a U.S. plaintiff—the 
SEC—not a foreign plaintiff.178  Second, the action alleges claims 
against a U.S. adviser, not a foreign adviser.179  Third, the action 
was brought under the Advisers Act, not the Exchange Act.180  
The Gruss court also pointed to the Dodd-Frank amendment in 
section 929P discussed above to support Congress’s intent to 
apply the Act extraterritorially in SEC enforcement actions.181  
The court then identified a key difference between the two 
statutes:  The purpose of the Exchange Act is to regulate 
transactions conducted on exchanges and over-the-counter; the 
purpose of the Advisers Act is to regulate fraudulent practices by 
advisers.182  According to the court, the focus of the Advisers Act 
is on the adviser and its actions, not on the client.183  This 
difference was cited to help justify different treatment under the 
Exchange Act and the Advisers Act.184 
Gruss is noteworthy for the court’s analysis of the differences 
between the Advisers Act and the Exchange Act and whether 
those differences justify a difference in extraterritorial 
application.  There are several reasons to question Gruss’s 
conclusion that the Advisers Act focuses on the adviser and not 
the client.  First, the Advisers Act is designed in part to protect 
advisory clients, just as the Securities Act and the Exchange Act 
are designed to protect investors.  Without the presence of clients 
or potential clients, there is no adviser under the Advisers Act; 
the Act defines an investment adviser as someone in the business 
of advising others for compensation.185  The Advisers Act’s 
findings at the front of the statute provide that advisory 
arrangements “with clients” are negotiated and performed by 
using means of interstate commerce.186  Clients are also 
 
177 Id. at 661. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 664. 
182 Id. at 662. 
183 Id. (“Clients and prospective clients are mentioned in the section’s 
subheadings and only in relation to advisers.”); id. at 663 (“Section 206 offers no 
private right of action, further demonstrating that the focus of the IAA is the adviser 
and not the client.”). 
184 Id. at 664–65. 
185 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012). 
186 § 201(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1(1). 
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mentioned in the prohibition on advisory contracts,187 the 
registration provision,188 the antifraud provision,189 and the 
custody provision.190 
In addition, the fact that the Advisers Act supposedly focuses 
on advisers as opposed to clients is not a reason the conduct and 
effects test should survive Morrison.  Recall that the Supreme 
Court invalidated the conduct and effects test as lacking a basis 
in law and as calling for speculation on what Congress may have 
wanted if it had thought about the case before the Court.  The 
difference set forth in Gruss between the Exchange Act and the 
Advisers Act does not address the Supreme Court’s fundamental 
criticism of the conduct and effects test. 
If the conduct and effects test is no longer viable, one is left 
with the question of whether and when the Advisers Act can be 
applied extraterritorially.  In a recent rulemaking release, the 
SEC answered this question by referring to the registration 
provision, which states that an adviser cannot use the means of 
interstate commerce unless registered.191  According to the SEC, 
a determination of extraterritorial application hinges on 
“whether there is sufficient use of U.S. jurisdictional means.”192  
This approach, however, is inconsistent with Morrison.  The 
approach starts with a presumption that the Act applies 
extraterritorially and permits the SEC to claim extraterritorial 
application when use of jurisdictional means is “sufficient.”193  
There is no basis, however, to determine what level of use would 
qualify as sufficient—and the conduct and effects test can no 
longer be a guide. 
C. Implications for Brokers 
The implications of Morrison for the regulation of non-U.S. 
domiciled broker-dealers are easier to assess than the 
implications for investment advisers because brokers are 
 
187 § 205(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a). 
188 § 203(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b). 
189 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6. 
190 § 223, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-23. 
191 Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers 
with Less than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private 
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3222, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,646 (July 6, 
2011). 
192 Id. at 39,674 n.415. 
193 Id. 
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regulated under the statute at issue in Morrison.  According to 
Morrison, the Exchange Act, except in limited circumstances, 
does not apply extraterritorially.  As discussed above, the 
Morrison Court referenced section 30(a) of the Exchange Act, 
which prohibits a broker-dealer from effecting on a non-U.S. 
exchange a transaction in a security of a U.S. issuer, in violation 
of an SEC rule.  Section 30(a) is a very specific grant of authority 
to adopt rules prohibiting a broker-dealer from using the U.S. 
jurisdictional means to transact securities of U.S. issuers on a 
non-U.S. exchange. It applies only in the case of transactions in 
the securities of a U.S. issuer.  The Court raised this example as 
the kind of specificity it believed necessary before an act can 
apply extraterritorially. 
Morrison’s affirmance of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality calls into question the framework behind Rule 
15a-6 and the SEC’s approach to regulating non-U.S. brokers.  As 
discussed above, when the SEC adopted Rule 15a-6, it started 
with the assumption that the Exchange Act applies 
extraterritorially because the terms broker and dealer do not 
refer to nationality.194  Instead of invoking a presumption against 
extraterritoriality in the face of congressional silence, the SEC 
invoked a presumption in favor of extraterritoriality, even 
pointing to the definition of the word “person,” which similarly 
includes no reference to nationality.195  After Morrison, the 
extraterritoriality presumption embodied in Rule 15a-6 is 
invalid, calling into question the legal regime instituted through 
the rule.  In SEC v. Benger, discussed above, the SEC tried to use 
Rule 15a-6 to support its position on extraterritoriality.  But the 
court stated that Rule 15a-6 could not control the case because it 
was adopted long before Morrison was decided.196  This is further 
evidence that the SEC may be unable to rely on Rule 15a-6 to 
support extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act after 
Morrison. 
The SEC might claim that, unlike the conduct and effects 
test for advisers, Rule 15a-6 is an agency rule, entitled to 
Chevron197 deference.  The Morrison Court left this door open.  In 
 
194 Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker Dealers, Exchange Act 
Release No. 27017, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,013, 30,016 (July 18, 1989). 
195 Id. at 30,016 n.40. 
196 SEC v. Benger, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
197 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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Morrison, the Solicitor General argued that the SEC had adopted 
an interpretation similar to the conduct test, which should be 
accorded deference.  The Court rejected that argument because, 
in the adjudications cited by the Solicitor General, the agency did 
not provide its own interpretation, relying instead on court 
decisions the Supreme Court was rejecting.198  The Morrison 
Court, therefore, left open the possibility that the SEC’s 
interpretation might stand if the agency provided an 
interpretation of extraterritorial application based on something 
other than citations to discredited cases.  The obvious candidate 
where such deference would be accorded is in agency rulemaking.  
Thus, the Commission may restore or preserve its ability to 
regulate by arguing that the agency should be accorded deference 
in the Rule 15a-6 context, even if such deference is not available 
for the conduct and effects test in the Advisers Act context.199 
Assessing this possibility would require a detailed discussion 
of administrative law.  A more complete analysis of whether the 
SEC can now, post-Morrison, interpret the law in its favor would 
first require determining whether Rule 15a-6 provides an 
independent rationale for applying the Exchange Act 
extraterritorially, and, if yes, whether the analysis could 
withstand the Supreme Court’s strong affirmance of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.  The analysis would 
likely depend on whether the Morrison Court’s construction of 
the Exchange Act follows from the unambiguous terms of the 
statute, or whether there is room for discretion.200  The agency 
might well prevail because Morrison suggested, albeit weakly, 
that interpreting the statute to apply extraterritorially was 
possible.201  Moreover, in Arlington v. FCC, the Supreme Court  
 
 
 
 
 
198 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 (2010). 
199 See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
200 Cf. National Cable v. Brand X Internet, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (holding 
that a court’s prior construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from unambiguous statutory terms). 
201 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (“At most, the Solicitor General’s proposed 
inference is possible; but possible interpretations of statutory language do not 
override the presumption against extraterritoriality.”). 
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held that an agency is entitled to deference in a determination of 
its own jurisdiction.202  These administrative law topics deserve 
their own detailed analysis in a separate article. 
Although Morrison asserted a strong presumption against 
extraterritoriality calling into question the SEC’s approach in 
Rule 15a-6, there is a silver lining for the regulators.  The Court’s 
opinion prompts a suggestion that the SEC consider proposing 
two new rules under the Exchange Act, one under section 30(a) 
and the other under section 30(b).  A new rule under section 
30(a), modeled on Rule 10b-5, could prohibit a broker-dealer from 
fraudulently effecting a transaction on a non-U.S. exchange in a 
security of a U.S. issuer.  A new rule under section 30(b) would 
be an anti-evasion rule, modeled on section 208(d) of the Advisers 
Act.203  The rule would prohibit persons from transacting in 
securities outside of the United States if the purpose of 
conducting the transaction outside of the United States was to 
evade the application of the Exchange Act or rules adopted under 
the Act.  Rules adopted under section 30 would have a different 
focus from Rule 15a-6.  Such rules would target U.S. broker-
dealers conducting business outside of the United States whereas 
Rule 15a-6 targets the conduct of non-U.S. broker-dealers 
seeking to do business in the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
Scholarship following Morrison has focused primarily on 
litigation and enforcement.  Such focus is understandable 
because Morrison’s context is the application of Exchange Act 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in a private enforcement action.  
But Morrison’s implications extend beyond litigation.  The case is 
also significant for determining whether and when the SEC can 
regulate and require registration of non-U.S. domiciled 
investment advisers and broker-dealers, regardless of whether 
litigation arises. 
 
202 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013). As discussed above, it is unclear whether the 
Exchange Act’s extraterritorial reach should be considered jurisdictional or 
substantive. See supra Part I.A. 
203 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 208(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(d) (2012) 
(providing that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person indirectly, or through or by any 
other person, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do 
directly under the provisions of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder”). 
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Regulation of non-U.S. advisers depends heavily on the 
conduct and effects test.  Regulation of non-U.S. brokers assumes 
the Exchange Act applies extraterritorially in face of 
congressional silence.  Regulation in both cases poses challenges 
after Morrison, which unmistakably rejected the conduct and 
effects test and forcefully asserted a presumption against 
extraterritoriality.  Regulating foreign firms under doctrines 
rejected by the Supreme Court will not withstand the test of 
time. 
Congress amended the federal securities laws in Dodd-Frank 
to provide for SEC and DOJ enforcement actions when the 
conduct and effects test is met.  But the Dodd-Frank amendment 
may not be enforceable and, in any case, it applies in the 
enforcement context, not in the context of the regulation and 
registration of foreign firms.  Regulators, therefore, will likely be 
considering their options and assessing whether and when 
regulation of non-U.S. domiciled advisers and brokers is 
appropriate in light of Morrison. 
 
